Abstract In this paper we derive the upper bounds of the cost inefficiencies of logit-based stochastic user equilibrium (SUE) traffic flow patterns under Advanced Traveler Information Systems (ATIS). All drivers are divided into two groups, one equipped with ATIS and another without, and both of which follow the logit-based SUE principle in route choice. The equipped drivers have less degree of travel time variability than the unequipped ones. The cost inefficiency is defined as a ratio between the total cost incurred by players in a SUE state and the minimum-possible total cost. The effects of various parameters on the bound are investigated. It is found that the increasing of congestion degree, total demand and network complexity will make the bound go up, while the promotion of ATIS market penetration and information quality will reduce the bound.
"price of anarchy" has been coined to characterize the degree of inefficiency which is the worst possible ratio between the total cost incurred by players in a Nash equilibrium situation and the minimum-possible total cost. The minimum-possible cost is generally implemented by centralized control. Roughgarden (2002) proved that the worst-case inefficiency due to selfish routing is independent of the network topology. Tardos (2002, 2004) further proved that the total time of a non-toll user equilibrium (UE) is at most that of the system optimum (SO) with doubled demand in the same network. Moreover, the total time of a non-toll UE is at most 4/3 times that of the SO when all link travel time functions are linear. Correa et al. (2004) provided a simple geometric proof for the price of anarchy for the user equilibrium with fixed demand, using a variational inequality (VI) expression of UE conditions. They also showed that the addition of link capacity constraints does not change the worst ratio between the best UE and the SO. Chau and Sim (2003) proved that the price of anarchy result still holds for systems with symmetric non-separable link travel time functions. The efficiency of atomic splittable selfish route with polynomial cost functions was studied by Yang et al. (2008) . Roughgarden (2005) summarized the latest developments of this research subject.
In the context of traffic networks, the studies up to date in deriving the inefficiency upper bounds contain such an assumption that the selfish drivers have perfect information about the network's traffic condition and know other drivers' route choices, so the deterministic UE state being reached. The interpretation of the stochastic user equilibrium (SUE) in the literature is that it is an outcome of all users' route choices for minimizing their perceived travel costs (Sheffi, 1984) . The perceived travel cost is regarded as a random variable due to travel time uncertainty and users' perception error of travel time.
Following this line of thinking, Guo and Yang (2005) and Yang and Huang (2005) investigated the bound of the cost inefficiency of a SUE flow pattern in relation to the Wardropian system optimum.
The advanced traveler information systems (ATIS) that provide travelers real-time information of traffic condition, are generally believed to be efficient in many aspects such as improving individuals' trip planning, alleviating road congestion and enhancing network performance. For investigating the multiple equilibrium behaviors of different classes of users, various multi-class traffic models have been developed, which differentiate travelers who receive information versus those who don't have information (Harker, 1988; Liu et al., 2007; Van Vuren and Watling, 1991; Yang, 1998) .
In this paper, we extend the works of Guo and Yang (2005) and Yang and Huang (2005) that dealt with single user class only, to the two-user class case in which one class is equipped with ATIS and another without. All drivers are divided into two classes, both of which follow the SUE principle in route choices. Drivers who are equipped with ATIS are able to receive real-time traffic information so as to assess the routes' attributes more accurately than unequipped drivers. This means equipped drivers have less degree of travel time variability than unequipped drivers. We derive the upper bounds of the cost inefficiencies caused by stochastic user equilibrium with two user classes and examine the effects of various parameters on the bound. These parameters are the ones reflecting the network's complexity, the link cost function's property, the ATIS quality and market penetration.
2 The SO and two-user class SUE models 
where v  is defined by
where 
where rw f and rw f are the path flows of equipped and unequipped drivers on path 
where rw c is the actual (or measured) travel time of path
. The existence and uniqueness of the path flow solution are guaranteed since all link travel time functions in the problem (3)- (8) are monotonically increasing and the feasible region is compact (Sheffi, 1984) . 
Determination of the cost inefficiency bound
Proof The problem (3)- (8) 
Now we turn to seek a bound for the sum of the third and forth terms of the right-hand-side of Eq. (16) or Eq. (17), and thereby bound the overall cost inefficiency of the two-user class SUE. Before doing this, we first introduce a lemma which has been proven in Guo and Yang (2005) and Yang and Huang (2005) . 
Lemma 2 Consider the following maximization problem
Furthermore, define so c T D   as the average travel time of all network users at system optimum. Then, from Eq. (26), we arrive at the following bounding result. (8) 
Theorem 1 Let C be a family of continuous, nondecreasing latency functions. Consider an instance of the two-user class SUE model (3)-
We note that the inefficiency bound given in Theorem 1 is a worst-case measure, taken over all possible instances. The actual ratio sue mixed  in realistic instances could be substantially smaller. Indeed, in a traffic network, the free-flow travel time is usually not a negligible fraction, which is encountered in both SUE and SO flow states. Here, similar to Correa et al. (2005) and Yang and Huang (2005) , we present a parameterized, improved bound on the inefficiency of SUE. (3)- (8) Recall that
Theorem 2 Let C be a family of continuous, nondecreasing latency functions. Consider an instance of the two-user class SUE model
Hence, both  and  are dimensionless coefficients that increase with the number of feasible paths, and thus reflect the degree of network complexity. If there is only one path available for each OD pair in the network, i.e., . This is the result of the standard SUE problem, identical to Yang and Huang (2005) , independent of the market penetration level.
Finally, we use a table to summarize the effects of all parameters on the cost inefficiency bound, see Table 1 . 
Conclusions
We have derived the cost inefficiency bound of a stochastic user equilibrium where all users are divided into two classes, one equipped with ATIS and another unequipped. Users of both classes follow the SUE principle in route choices, the equipped being able to receive real-time traffic information for helping route choice and thus having less degree of travel time variability than unequipped. We have further investigated the effects of various parameters which reflect the network's complexity, the link cost function's property, the ATIS quality and market penetration, on the bound of the cost inefficiency of the two-user class SUE flow pattern in relation to the Wardropian system optimum. The results are summarized in Table 1 .
Some issues that we are further investigating are: (a) to extend the analysis to the case with elastic demand; (b) to study the two-user class SUE model with link capacity constraints; and (c) to seek more accurate bound for some specific classes of link cost functions.
